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ScienceDirectMultiple paradigms have emerged within the broad payments
for ecosystem services (ES) domain for internalizing
externalities of local land-use change decisions. These range
from reward of ready-made ES delivery (commoditised) to
reward of processes of ES generation (co-investment).
Evidence from tree-based projects in Africa suggests that
currently, only carbon sequestration and emission reduction
are ‘commoditised’, however in an artificial way where
payments are not matched to ES delivery, but adjusted or
supplemented with co-benefits. Co-investment in stewardship
alongside rights is more widespread and versatile for a variety
of ES. Efficiency concerns of co-investment schemes can be
addressed when commoditised ES or profitable enterprises
with positive ES externalities evolve from these.
Addresses
1 World Agroforestry Centre, ICRAF, P.O. Box 30677, Nairobi 00100,
Kenya
2 Faculty of Social Sciences, Uganda Christian University, P.O. Box 4,
Mukono, Uganda
Corresponding authors: Namirembe, Sara (sara.namirembe@gmail.com)
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2014, 6:89–97
This review comes from a themed issue on Sustainability challenges
Edited by Cheikh Mbow, Henry Neufeldt, Peter Akong Minang,
Eike Luedeling and Godwin Kowero
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial
Available online 1st December 2013
1877-3435  # 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2013.10.016
Introduction
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) is a conditional
instrument where environmental stewards are given incen-
tives to maintain or improve the flow of environmental
services (ES) by those that benefit from these flows. For
tree-based systems, various PES approaches with different
levels of conditionality [1,2] are used. A synthesis of PES
lessons in Asia categorised PES into three paradigms:
‘Commoditisation’ of Environmental Services, ‘Compen-
sation’ for Opportunities Skipped and ‘Co-investment’ in
Open access under CC BY license.www.sciencedirect.com Stewardship’ [3]. Commoditisation’ entails recurrent pay-
ments for actual delivery of a specified ES conforming to
market-based mechanisms. A subcategory establishes a
direct link between environmental service performance
and existing commodity markets, generally through a pro-
cess of eco-certification [2]. ‘Compensation’ entails pay-
ment for acceptance of restrictions or achievement of a
condition or proxy to specified environmental outcomes.
‘Co-investment’ entails conditional rewards that are not
market-driven, involving flexible contracts entrusting
resource management and monitoring with local commu-
nities, with broad performance sanctions. Co-investment
rewards are based on either proxies trusted to deliver a
specific ES, a set of best-bet practices trusted to deliver an
unspecified set of ES, or permits for actions trusted to
generate positive ES externalities. In these projects, mostly
financed from public or donor sources [4–6] due to lack of
ES demand, emphasis is not placed on measuring out-
comes, but rather, on motivating actions or ‘good land use
practices’ for ecosystem health as a public good (Table 1).
In Africa, many tree-based PES projects fall within the
‘softer’ PES paradigm with characteristics of ‘co-invest-
ment’ and without explicit frameworks for monitoring and
evaluating environmental service outcomes. It has been
argued that this tends to be less efficient and not much
different from past Integrated Conservation and Devel-
opment Projects (ICDP) [7]. This desk review examined
the ‘state-of-the-art’ in fifty tree-based PES projects in
Africa from inventories and other publications (comprising
27 carbon sequestration and emission reduction, 17 biodi-
versity conservation, 2 watershed function and 4 bundled
ES) to recommend design of efficient and fair PES in the
African context (summarised in Figure 1 and Annex 1). We
examine how variations in conditionality with land owners
affect fairness and efficiency in delivering ES outcomes.
Levels of conditionality with land owners were not always
clear-cut, but guided by criteria presented in Table 1,
projects could be generalized into the following categories:
30% ‘commoditisation’, 12% ‘compensation’ and 58% ‘co-
investment’ (Table 2).
How realistic is commoditisation in
tree-based projects?
Tree-based projects generate multiple ES values [8]
but so far demand that fits the commoditisation model
exists for only carbon sequestration or emission reduction
services, where projects are assessed per unit carbon,
proven through third-party verification and certification.Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2014, 6:89–97
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Table 1
Categorisation [2,3] of tree-based PES projects in Africa
Reward mechanism Sub-category Performance
indicator
Preconditions Type of reward Principle for
establishing reward
Examples of source
of reward
Strictness of
conditionality
Commoditisation Commoditisation of
environmental
services (ES) as such
Delivery of specified
ES above agreed
baseline level
Clarity of property rights
on land, trees and ES;
compliance with legal
requirements for ES
generation
Cash or in-kind
rewards to individuals
or groups. Sometimes
with co-benefits
Willingness of buyers to
pay for ES additional to
a baseline status
Global regulated or
voluntary carbon
markets
Payment proportional to
quantity of specified,
verified and certified ES
additional to a baseline.
Environmental
service branding of
established
commodities
Audited compliance
with certification
standards, with
clarified force major
clauses
Existing commodity
markets with interest in
ES enhancement
Maintenance of
market share (traded
volumes) and/or price
Willingness of
consumers to pay
premium price for
quality of production
process rather than the
product as such
Eco-certified coffee,
cacao or tea; Forest
Stewardship Council
certification of timber
Certification standards
and auditing practice
are under public
scrutiny
Compensation Adherence to
restrictions or
proxies for
generation of
specified ES beyond
legal requirements
Legality of ES reducing
practices that are
foregone and now
compensated
Cash or in-kind
rewards to individuals
or groups. Sometimes
with revenue or benefit
sharing
Willingness of sellers to
accept compensation
for opportunity costs for
maintaining or
enhancing existing
baseline ES status
International
conservation
organisations,
wildlife tourism or
niche market
commodity
consumers
Payment proportional to
opportunity cost of land
and/or of adherence to
specified restrictions or
conservation actions.
Co-investment Payment for effort
proven or trusted to
generate specified
ES
Proof of actions
known for generation
of specified ES
Mechanisms can
include creation of
preconditions for other
reward mechanisms
In-kind to groups.
Inputs, for example,
seedlings, labour.
Sometimes with
capacity building and
advisory support
Mutual sharing of roles
to achieve livelihood
and ES outcomes.
Ownership of ES
sometimes distinct from
ownership of
livelihoods.
Conservation
organisations,
conservation funds,
carbon brokers
Payment proportional to
effort (e.g. number of
trees planted) for
achieving ES outcome
Incentive for a set of
efforts for ecosystem
management
without specifying
ES
Achievement of
mutually negotiated
actions for
maintaining or
enhancing existing/
base line condition of
an ecosystem
In-kind:-access to or
(co-) ownership of
resources or support
of conservation
friendly enterprise, for
example, bee keeping.
Benefit sharing
Precautionary
investment in
management plans for
meaningful participation
of local stakeholders as
insurance banking for
ES without market
demand.
International
conservation
organisations;
Conservation funds;
national
governments
Negotiated rewards
provided fully and good
relations maintained,
with continuous
negotiation and
encouragement of good
performance. Rewards
can be completely
withdrawn but this is
rare.
Incentives for private
businesses that
generate positive ES
externalities
Maintaining or
enhancing baseline
condition of
ecosystem
License permits, rights
or (co) ownership of
resource to
businesses or
community
organisations.
Willingness of buyers to
pay for high value
commodities or
services that may
maintain or enhance
unspecified ES(s).
National
governments
Permits upheld
provided there are no
negative environmental
impacts
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Figure 1
PES and PES-like mechanisms in Africa
KEY:
PES paradigms in Africa
Ecosystem service
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Trust Fund for Dzanga-Sangha Reserve [5]
Northern Savanna [6]
Joint Forest Management [31]
Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation
Trust [31]
Participatory Environmental Management [31]
Co-Management in national parks & Forest Reserves 
[31]
Wildlife Management Areas [45]
Budongo Forest Eco-tourism [31]
Arabuko Sokoke Forest Management & Conservation 
[31]
Mabira Forest Reserve Eco-tourism [31]
Community Based Forest Management [5]
Tropical Forest Conservation Fund [5]
Foundation for Financing Protected Areas [5]
Foundation for Protected Areas & Biodiversity [5]
Eastern Arc Mountain Conservation Endowment
Fund [5]
Tanzania land Conservation Trust [36**]
Shea butter carbon (concept) [38]
Greenbelt movement [38]
Biodiversity Corridor Conservation [38]
Trees of hope (PV) [38]
Lurio forest plantation (PV) [30]
Ewasso Ngiro South Development Authority [31]
FACE [31] 
Bio energy resource Ltd (BERL) [38]
Lake Naivasha Watershed Management [40]
Equitable Payments for Watershed Services [5]
Baviaanskloof Patensie project [31]
Kilombero Valley Teak Company Ltd (KVTCL) [5]
Community-based Rangeland Rehabilitation [39]
Kasokwa Community Chimpanzee Conservation [31]
Foundation for Protected Areas & Biodiversity; 
Protected Areas & Network [6]
Shompole Ecotourism Development [35**]
Ibi Batéké [38]
1
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10
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16
Makira Conservation [25]
Mantadia Biodiversity Corridor 
Conservation [25]
Ankotrofotsy Afforestation 1000 ha [25]
Acacia Senegal plantation 7,869 ha [38]
Trees for Global Benefits (TGB) SOFALA 
[38, 16]
TGB Plan Vivo (PV) [26, 31]
Acacia community plantations [19]
The International Small Group Tree 
Planting [16]
Nile Basin [31]
Wildlife Works [38]
Kibale Forest wild Coffee [31]
Cocoa carbon [38]
Western Kenya Agroforestry [31]
Humbo Assisted Natural Regeneration [38]
Commoditised
Co-investment - based on proxy
Co-investment – business/ permits with positive
      ES externalities
Co-investment - based on a set of practices for a 
combination of ES
Compensation
Co-investment
Commodification
Compensation
Carbon
Biodiversity
Water
Bundled
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Table 2
Reward mechanisms for tree-based PES projects in Africa
Reward mechanism Number of projects Ecosystem services
Commoditised 15
Compensation 6
Co-investment 29
Total 50
Carbon, Biodiversity, Water, General.Commoditisation is not applied in any of the current
payments for watershed services [9] or biodiversity
schemes in Africa. Of the 14 commoditised projects, 11
involved transactions between small-scale farmers or
national governments mostly financed by the World Bank
Bio-carbon fund and multi-national entities. In general,
ES sellers had limited expertise and capacity to cover
upfront costs of such projects, and therefore received just
a fraction of the carbon proceeds. For example, the
portion of carbon proceeds land owners received was
10% under Green Resources in Tanzania [10] and $4/t
for carbon prices ranging between US$6 and US$20/t
under Ecotrust in Uganda [11]. They sometimes regarded
such projects with suspicion [12]. Nonetheless, it was
carbon payments that made projects viable in the first
place, providing non-carbon payments that motivated
farmers to participate. Regular guaranteed payments
enabled farmers to access health, school and financial
services for example, in Ecotrust [13].
Projects were established on large government (or aggre-
gated smallholder) properties resulting in large volumes
of credits and low per ton costs of transaction and imple-
mentation. This tended to exclude the poor or those
without land titles [13,14,15], except for some pro-poor
projects such as TGB and TIST [16]. Aggregated small-
holdings were less competitive [17], and the preference
for large government land areas resulted in projects with
multiple (e.g. [18–20]) or communal land tenure (e.g. Nile
Basin and Humbo Projects [21]), where establishment of
ownership of carbon rights became problematic.
This review could not establish the opportunity costs
resulting from restriction in flexibility ES providers could
exercise in alternating landuses under these projects,
which were designed to span 20 years to 100 years. In
theory payments should be elastic based on global carbon
prices, but they were mostly fixed (e.g. [19]), based onCurrent Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2014, 6:89–97 opportunity cost estimations or the price of carbon at the
time of agreement [11]. Fixed carbon prices are easier to
manage [22] and may buffer farmers against extreme
price reductions, but may also unfairly cap their potential
profits in case of price surges. There was also likelihood
that recurrent project costs would increase over time
[23,24]. Payment was often low, thus project proponents
packaged it in various ways to create incentive. For
example, it was aggregated over a shortened period
(e.g. ECOTRUST made 30 year payments within the
first 10 years [13]), made as a lump sum for a development
program (e.g. Ankotrofotsy [25]), purposely coincided
with times of need such as beginning of school [11],
offered as credit guarantee for loans [13], or supple-
mented with co-benefits [11]. This artificial commoditi-
sation has long-term implications on compliance [26], as
was observed in a carbon-contract project in Malawi [27].
The potential for commodity-based compensation through
price premiums could not be established in this review, but
the single example of Kibale coffee showed that branding
for such niche markets could be challenging [28].
Is compensation of proxies more appropriate
for tree-based systems?
Most ‘compensation’ schemes involved governments or
community groups with formal land tenure [29], setting
aside land for biodiversity services for long periods, with
restrictions on grazing, agriculture and use of fire. The
‘buyers’ then translated the restrictions into ES outcomes
that they sold. Green Resources [30] for example paid a
99 year land lease to the Tanzania government for tree
plantations, then developed and sold carbon credits [31].
Similarly, in the Tanzania Land Conservation Trust
(TLCT) project, land was leased for 99 years and com-
munities were compensated for restrictions in favour of
wildlife conservation as tourism business was developed.
Opportunity-cost based ‘compensation’ schemes aiming to
avoid worsening the prevailing status of landowners, have
gained from research on reverse auction [27,29] and
conjoint analysis for designing contracts and estimating
opportunity cost. In many on-going schemes though, ‘com-
pensation’ was often low, based on the minimum level
from sellers’ willingness to accept (WTA) payments [32]. It
was even lower for poorer land owners in remote locations
with low market exposure [33,34]. Where institutions
restricted resource ownership and rendered many actions
‘illegal’ and ineligible for compensation (e.g. Shompole
project [35] and TLCT project [36]), the WTA was
artificial and costs from landuse restrictions, displacement
of livelihoods [34], increased wildlife numbers and tourist
traffic [35,36] were not really ‘compensated’. In some
instances (e.g. Shompole and TLCT), commitments of
compensation were not fully honoured by the companies
that had the concessions. Therefore, compensation was
rarely achieved and with the tendency to capture rent bywww.sciencedirect.com
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fairer than the ‘commoditisation’ model.
Is co-investment better than payment?
Co-investment projects were the most widespread, often
having evolved from government supported participatory
forest management. Land ownership was not always a
pre-requisite for participation in co-investment projects.
Most projects provided an easement in community access
to forest resources on public or government controlled
land (e.g. Joint forest management and eco-tourism pro-
jects in Uganda and Tanzania). Many of the project
designs provided for inclusion of smallholder farmers
and women, for example, Greenbelt [37], Trees of Hope
[38], community based rangeland management in Bara
[39] and use of payment vouchers by EPWS [40]. How-
ever, some co-investment projects working directly with
government tended to exclude local people (e.g. FACE
Foundation [31]) or made no provisions for their involve-
ment (e.g. Kilombero [41]). The buyer–seller sub-
division was sometimes indistinct as agreements were
based on co-valuation of agreed interventions and sharing
of roles [42,20]. Nevertheless, power dichotomies existed
as in other PES paradigms [43,44].
Incentives were conditional to satisfaction of performance
indicators of effort, which were assessed over large time
intervals (sometimes 5 years). Performance was judged
subjectively using a binary scale as either ‘good’ or ‘poor’
(e.g. Equitable Payments for Watershed Services —
EPWS — projects in Tanzania and Kenya). Sanctions
to withdraw or sustain incentives were sometimes nego-
tiable. Delivery of ES was not made explicit, which
avoided overdue focus on a single ES, but also obscured
project effectiveness. In EPWS projects, payment was
made for proxies in trust, and whether desired ES out-
comes were achieved was then verified through subsidi-
ary measurements outside the agreement. Sometimes
private-sector led commoditised sub-projects were nested
within co-investment projects, for example, FACE
Foundation [31], Lurio Forest Plantation [30], Ewasso
Ngiro South project [31] and BERL project [38].
Incentives were mostly in-kind including granting of
access or ownership rights, or support with start-up costs
for community enterprises. Rewards were given collec-
tively, encompassing free riders too. The incentive, often
determined top-down was not valued against cost of
effort. There is no evidence from experimental impact
analysis to show effectiveness of projects. However, per-
formance at project level was generally low, even though
based on broad indicators. The risk of communities view-
ing incentives as entitlements [1] could not be overruled.
Incentives were supplemented with revenue or co-benefits
from ecotourism (e.g. Mabira, Budongo [31] and Wami
Mbiki [45] projects) and commoditised sub-projects (e.g.www.sciencedirect.com in Kilombero Valley Teak Company). Commonly though,
these are what motivated performance and potential for
improvingefficiencybymakingthemconditional shouldbe
explored. In instances where the practices themselves were
substantially beneficial (e.g. EPWS [46], Ecotrust [47],
Arabuko Sokoke, Wami Mbiki and Mbomipa), perform-
ance increased and projects attracted more participants.
Conclusion
The strength of PES in improving natural resource man-
agement is in its emphasis on conditionality. However, in
its strictest ‘commoditised’ form, it stagnated at only
delivering tree-based carbon sequestration and emission
reduction services, dependent on external global markets
and likely to crowd out other conservation motivations
[15]. Commoditisation could not fully mimic market
principles as payments needed to be adjusted because of
low carbon prices to ensure fairness. Its tendency to focus
on piecemeal ES, made it difficult to fit into existing
governance frameworks [48], knowledge demanding and
expensive. Given what ES buyers are WTP, options for
financing ES accounting costs from sources other than the
ES providers (e.g. through partnership with national
research institutions), should be explored.
‘Co-investment’ though more widespread in the African
market-scarce context is criticised for its potential erratic
compliance [49]. It can potentially deliver a range of ES to
society through a systems focus [50], beyond what could be
driven by ES buyers. However it must demonstrate the
intended improvement in per hectare performance beyond
ICDPs [51,52] by directly targeting and accounting for ES
outcomes rather than targeting inputs, activities and
incomplete proxies. Performance can be improved through
strengthening conditionalities, translating proxies into ES
outcomes, nesting commoditised ES subprojects into co-
investment projects, and developing profitable enterprises
with positive ES externalities within co-investment pro-
jects. None of the paradigms provided satisfactory incen-
tives for landowners. However, co-investment incentives
in certain instances created opportunities for development
of commoditised ES.
Commoditisation enhances efficiency, but because it is
applicable only where markets exist and these have not
expanded widely for tree based projects, ES flows can only
be ensured if compensation and co-investment alternatives
demonstrate efficiency. Provisions for strengthening
capacity to account for ES outcomes in co-investment
projects (such as finding supplementary financing, training
staff and partnering with research institutions) need to be
developed as good practice to enhance efficiency in target-
ing investments. This might build the trust necessary for
catalysing evolution of commoditised ES demand.
Appendix A
See Table A1.Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2014, 6:89–97
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Table A1
Categorization of PES mechanisms in Africa
No. Project Buyer Seller Conditionality: Payment for. . .
Commoditised
1 Village based management
of woody savannah [19]
World Bank Biocarbon
Fund (WBCF)
Villagers CO2 at US$3.50/t Co-benefit:
capacity building
2 Ibi Bate´ke´ [38] WBCF; Danone NOVACEL 2.4 MtCO2 in 30 y — reforestation
and reduced shifting cultivation; co-
benefit: schools/health facilities;
forest products
3 Humbo Assisted Natural
Regeneration [38]
World Vision Ethiopia 7 community cooperatives 0.88 MtCO2 in 30 y — reforesting,
foregoing grazing, fuelwood
collection and charcoal in 2728 ha
forest; co-benefit: access
4 Western Kenya Agroforestry
[31]
WBCF Community Over 1.2 Mt soil carbon -
agroforestry and other practices
5 Makira Conservation [25] Mitsubishi Group rock
group; Pearl Jam WB;
USAID Japan; NAVTEQ
Ministry of Environment,
Water, Forests, & Tourism
(MEWFT)
9.5 MtCO2 in 30 y
6 Mantadia Biodiversity
Corridor Conservation [25]
Foreign countries Local government; MEWFT 1.2 MtCO2 in 30 y reforestation;
25 MtCO2 in 30 y from REDD; Co-
benefit: agricultural productivity
7 Ankotrofotsy Afforestation
1000 ha [25]
3 C Factor was conducting
negotiations in 2008; no
updated information
Tany Meva Foundation
with 3 local community
groups
0.18 MtCO2 in 60 y; co-benefits:
development, incomes and capacity
building projects
8 Acacia Senegal plantation
7869 ha [38]
WBCF; Deguessi Groupe Local communities 0.45 MtCO2 by 2017 Co-benefit:
gum, land access for inter-cropping
9 Trees for Global Benefits
(TGB) SOFALA [38,16]
Tetrapak; Future Forests
U&W Humbleside
Individuals
Nhambita Community
Association
2.1 MtCO2 in 99 y Co-benefit:
community development;
livelihoods, credit
10 TGB Plan Vivo (PV) [26,31] Same as above Farmers through
Environment Conservation
Trust (Ecotrust)
0.05 MtCO2/y for 100 y
11 Acacia community
plantations [19]
Achats Services
International
15 000 farmers 1.8 MtCO2 by 2017 Co-benefit:
Gum, firewood, timber, capacity
building
12 The International Small
Group Tree Planting [16]
CAAC 4309 farmer groups 0.5–3 MtCO2 CAAC owns carbon
Co-benefit: tree ownership; welfare
projects
13 Nile Basin [31] WBCF National Forestry Authority
(NFA) & communities
0.28 MtCO2e in 20 y
14 Wildlife Works [38] NedBank Group Ltd Community 49 MtCO2e in 30 y — restricted
grazing Co-benefits: youth
employment
15 Kibale Forest wild Coffee
[31]
Kibale Forest Foundation
Uganda Coffee Trade
Federation
Arabica farmers Maintaining biologically diverse
ecosystems for premium price for
coffee
Compensation
16 Cocoa carbon [38] To be identified Farmer groups Halting expansion of farms into
unprotected forest and forest
reserves for REDD
17 Green resources [30] Green Resources Tanzania government Land and taxes. Company owns
carbon
18 Shompole Ecotourism
Development [35]
Shompole Community
Trust Kenya Wildlife
Service, African
Conservation Center, Art of
Ventures
Shompole Group Ranch Exclusive conservation area —
10 000 ha
19 Foundation for Protected
Areas & Biodiversity;
Protected Areas Network [6]
GEF + GoM Various Reducing slash and burn —
biodiversity
20 Tanzania Land Conservation
Trust [36]
Investors in wildlife via
African Wildlife Foundation
Manyara Ranch Setting aside or selling land’ grazing
restrictions — conservation. Co-
benefit livestock improvement
21 Kasokwa Community
Chimpanzee Conservation
[31]
Tourists, researchers,
schools
Communities Restricted land use — conservation
Co-benefit: tourism revenue
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Table A1 (Continued )
No. Project Buyer Seller Conditionality: Payment for. . .
Co-investment-based on proxy
22 Shea butter carbon
(concept) [38]
To be identified Communities Tree planting Co-benefits: portion of
carbon revenue
23 Greenbelt movement [38] WBCF Community forest
associations
Reforesting 1500 ha degraded
land — carbon
24 Biodiversity Corridor
Conservation [38]
WBCF Mandtadia government
and communities
Linking fragmented habitats for 14.6
MtCO2e Co-benefit: fruit gardens
25 Trees of hope (PV) [38] Clinton hunter Foundation Farmers Tree planting for livelihoods and
carbon Co-benefit: pledged carbon
cash
26 Lurio forest plantation (PV)
[30]
Associac¸a˜o Envirotrade
Carbon Livelihoods
Green Resources Tree planting. Developers own
carbon.
27 Community-based
Rangeland Rehabilitation
[39]
Environment Ministry Local community, Bara
Province
Forestry/rangelands rehabilitation
for carbon. Co-benefits: community
development
28 FACE [31] FACE Foundation - Dutch
Electricity Generating
Board
Uganda Wildlife Authority
(UWA)
Reforestation of degraded park
FACE owns carbon
29 Ewasso Ngiro South
Development Authority [31]
Spanish Government,
GEF, Green Belt
Movement
Communities Reforestation, regeneration of Mau
forest and adjacent land–carbon
30 Baviaanskloof Patensie
project [31]
Not identified Baviaanskloof Patensie
Community
Labour for land rehabilitation
31 Kilombero Valley Teak
Company Ltd (KVTCL) [5]
KVTCL Village-groups Establishment of timber plantations;
co-benefit: 10% of carbon revenues
32 Bio energy resources Ltd
(BERL) [38]
BERL Farmers Jatropha seeds — 15 000 trees
33 Lake Naivasha Watershed
Management [40]
Flower farmers Upstream WRUAs Soil and water conservation
practices (SWCP)
34 Equitable Payments for
Watershed Services [5]
DAWASCO, Coca Cola Villages SWCP
35 Amboseli [6] UNEP/UNDP, FAO Amboseli Park, Group
Ranches, Communities
Reforesting landscapes for
biodiversity
Co-investment-based on a set of practices for a combination of ES
36 Trust Fund for Dzanga-
Sangha Reserve [6]
Donors Landowners Joint management plan to restore
landscapes (JMPL) — biodiversity
37 Northern Savanna [6] Community Increasing landscape productivity to
spare biological corridors
38 Foundation for Financing
Protected Areas [5]
Donors Landowners JMPL
39 Tropical Forest
Conservation Fund [5]
Donors Landowners Joint forest management —
biodiversity
40 Foundation for Protected
Areas and Biodiversity [5]
Various donors Landowners JMPL
41 Eastern Arc Mountain
Conservation Endowment
Fund [5]
Various donors Landowners JMPL
42 Joint Forest Management
[31]
Forestry & Bee keeping
Division, Ministry of Natural
Resources & Tourism
Village governments 5–10 y management plan —
biodiversity
43 Mgahinga Bwindi
Impenetrable Forest
Conservation Trust [31]
UWA Communities Participation in forest
conservation — management plan
44 Participatory Environmental
Management [31]
CARE, TFCG Villages Management plan. Community
institutions strengthened —
biodiversity
45 Co-Management in national
parks and Forest Reserves
[31]
Government (UWA/NFA) Communities Forest access rights in return for
protecting resource use areas
Co-investment-business/permits with positive ES externalities
46 Wildlife Management Areas
[45]
Tourists Wami Mbiki and Mbomipa
Societies
Right to develop business that
enhances forest status —
management plan
47 Budongo Forest Eco-
tourism [31]
Ecotourism business Communities JGI - same -
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2014, 6:89–97
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Table A1 (Continued )
No. Project Buyer Seller Conditionality: Payment for. . .
48 Arabuko Sokoke Forest
Management and
Conservation [31]
KNH-NABU, USAID
Birdlife International, WWF
Community - same -
49 Mabira Forest Reserve
Eco-tourism [31]
NFA Communities - same -
50 Community Based Forest
Management [5]
Local District Authorities Village governments Full forest ownership for
conservation management plan
**Numbers in brackets indicate literature sources presented in the reference list.References and recommended reading
Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review,
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